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Although recent research suggests that intergenerational transfers play
an important role in aggregate capital accumulation, our understanding of
bequest motives remains incomplete. We develop a simple model of
"exchange—motivated" bequests, in which a testator influences the decisions of
his beneficiaries by holding wealth in bequeathable forms and by conditioning
the division of bequests on the beneficiaries' actions. The model generates
falsifiable empirical predictions which are inconsistent with other theories of
intergenerational transfers. We present econometric and other evidence which

















Bequests as a Means of Payment
ABSTRACT"Tell Ire, try daughters
(Since now we will divest us 'both of rule,
Interest of territory, cares of state).
Which of you shall we say doth love us rrost,
That we our largest bounty tray extend
Where nature doth with rrerit challenge."
—KingLear, Shakespeare (1608)
uchrecent research suggests that intergenerational transfersplay an
itrportant role in aggregate capital accun'ulation. Kotlikoff and Surrrers (1981)
estiirate that about four—fifths of U.S. wealth accurrulatiort is dueto interge-
nerational transfers.1 Several other studies, including Brittain(1978). Nirer
(1979), and Bernheitr (l98la) have found that thesavings behavior of retirees is
inconsistent with strong forrrs of the Life Cycle Hypothesis.2While interge-
nerational transfers appear to be of central iirportance inunderstanding pat-
terns of capital accutrulation and fatrilial behavior,relatively little is known
about what rrotivates individuals to leave bequests.
In this paper we develop a Irodel of "exchange rotivated"bequests, and pre-
sentsorre preliirinary eirpirical tests of it. The central prexriseunderlying our
forirulation is that testators use bequests to influence the behaviorof poten-
tial beneficiaries. Such influencetray beovert as when parents threaten to
disinherit triscreant offspring, or irore subtle as whenparentsrewardIrre
attentivechildrenwith fatrily heirloorrs. As we discuss below, tro.1els of
exchange rrotivated bequests have very different irrplications for the effectsof
institutions such as Social Security and private pensionson the x'ate of capital
forn'ation, and individual behavior Irore generally, than do alternative irodels.
In our theoretical forirulation, we envision a testator whoderives satis-
faction froir consuxrption, and who is also affected by actions takenindividually
by a nun'ber of potential beneficiaries. The testator has no conventional—2—
bequest irotive, and so, apart fron' strategic considerations, would prefer to
hold his entire wealth in annuities. However, his preferences differ froir those
of his potential beneficiaries (he ray, for exairple. wish to receive additional
attention, or irore generally to alter behavior). By holding wealth in
bequeathable forirs and by conditioning the division of bequests (perhaps through
inforrrl ireans) on actions taken, he can atterrpt to influence his beneficiaries'
decisions. However, he is constrained in this regard by considerations of
credibility; he cannot, for exan'pie, credibly threaten universal disinheritance.
We show that as long as there are at least two credible beneficiaries, it is
possible for the testator to devise a siirple, intuitively appealing bequest
rule which overcoires the problea' of credibility, and allows hut' to appropriate
all surplus generated froir testator—beneuiciary interaction. This surplus pro-
vides the incentive for the testator to hold at least part of his wealth in
bequeathable forirs.
No single tractable analytic irodel can capture as varied a phenorenon as
intergenerational transfers. We believe, however, that the trodel of exchange
rrotivated bequests presented here is a valuable suppleirent to conventional for—
irulations which rely on ad—hoc bequest irotives or intergenerational altruisir.
In particular, our irodel helps to explain several eirpirical observations which
seerrinconsistent with other forirulations. Furtherirore, it generates falsi—
fiable eirpirical predictions, thereby lending itself to econorretric testinr.
Since undertaking this project, the authors have frequently been accused of
harboring a perhaps too pessirristic view of huiran nature. It is therefore
iirportant to exrphasize that we intend for the current work to supplerrent,rather—3—
than substitute for, current theories of bequests. Surely, not all individuaTs
behave unipu1atively, nor does hinted self—interestnecessarily determine
the disposition of' all bequeathable wealth. However, even theoptimist rrust
concede that certain cases sirack of financial motivation. For example,rich,
elderly, childless widows often appear to have unusually attentive relatives.
More coirironly, although n'any families seem to divide the bulk of financial
wealth in accordance with certain principles of fairness, specificpossessions
(for instance, heirlooms and other valuables)rray be distributed in part on the
basis of "Irerit." We model, a polar extretre in order to highlightanalysis of
the exchange irotive, rather than to suggest the absence of other motivation.
The relative significance of different motives is properly thesubject of
exrpirical inquiry (as in sections II and III), rather than casual anecdotes.
The notion that bequests xray arise as a consequence of exchange between
parents and children has previously received varying arrounts of attention from
Sussmran etal. (19T0), Barro (1971, footnote i4),Ben—Porath(19T8), Adains
(1980), Kotlikoff and Spivak (1981), Tomes (1981), and Becker (19Th. 1981).
These studies, however, lack a coirplete model of the exchangeprocess. Where
forn'al rrodels of exchange are developed, it is implicitly assured that unwrit-
ten agreen'ents between family meinbers are perfectly enforceable.By exp'icitly
n'odelling the strategic choices of parties of such agreeirents, we generite
sharp, empirically testable predictions concerning the circurrstnces under which
these agreeirents are enforceable.
Aside froir the issue of enforceability, our analysis is perhaps irostclosely
related to that of Becker (19Th.. 1981), but in his framework, theparent(testator) is an altruist, and is prixrarily concerned with alleviating inter—
farrily conflict (see, however. Becker's discussion of "ireritgoods"). We rodel
a wore elaborate gawe in which testators act selfishly at tiires, prorroting
conflict airong potential beneficiaries to achieve personally desired goals.
Further, we explicitly link the exchange r'otive to decisions to holdwealth in
bequeathable, as opposed to annuitized forirs.
The paper is organized as follows. Section I presents our irodel of
exchange trotivated bequests and characterizes its solution.In section II, we
present econorretric evidence on bequeathable assets and beneficiarybehavior
which supports the trodel. Section III discusses the ability of various bequest
theories to account for certain stylized facts. Finally, in section IV we exa—
wine sorre iirplications of our nndel for issues such as the effect of Social
Security, governirerit debt, and private pensions on capital forrrationand fan'ily
behavior. Conclusions are also presented.
I. A_Model of Exchange Motivated Beauests
In this section, we present a riodel in which savings and bequests are
partly deteririned by non—cooperative interaction airongself—interested agents.
For a variety of reasons, testators' preferences tray not coincidewith those of
their potential beneficiaries. In such cases, decisions of potentialbenefi-
ciaries tray be influenced by the hope of financial reward. Exairplesabound: An
individual might desire wore attention from his children, object to arelative's
choice of spouse, or want to be cared for by a sibling or grandchild.
Institutions (such as universities) corrironly treat wealthy patrons particularly—5—
well,perhaps to encourage further support in the forw of gifts and bequests.
A forrral discussion of strategic issues necessarily requiresus to seTect a
structural xrodel. In particular, we envision a world in which thetestator is a
dotrinant, fully inf'orwed player. By designing the rules governing the division
of bequests, he influences the behavior of potentialbeneficiaries, extracting
the full surplus generated by this exchange. Thereare, of course, a variety of
other ways to irodel exchange Irotivated bequests; ours hasno particular ariorj
ciairr to realisir. However, it does have the virtue ofsiirplicity and trac-
tability, and in addition generates falsiuiable errpirica]. predictions whichare
inconsistent with other irodels of intergenerationaltransfers, which lack the
elewent of exchange. This allows us to test the irodel insections II and III.
On the whole, the evidence appears to support thehypothesis that bequests are
used extensively to facilitate intrafawily exchange.
In solving for the equilibria of the galre described in thefollowing sub-
section, we wake extensive use of Selten's (1975) notion of subgareperfect
Nash Equilibriuir. Forirally, an equilibriuir is subgaireperfect if strategies
forir an equilibriuir in every proper subgarre. Intuitively, thisrefinerrent of
the Nash concept requires agents to act in a narrically consistentfashion
(that is, in their own interests) both on and off theequilibriuxr path. This is
coirironly interpreted as weaning that an agent cannot credibly threaten to take
in certain contingencies actions, which, should thosecontingencies arise, would
be contrary to his interests. In the case of bequests, testatorsobviously need
to establish credibility in order to wanipulate potential beneficiaries.
Threats of universal disinheritance are, for exairple, unlikely to be belicved.—6—
Ourtask is to show that the testator can (in our wodel) successfully tranipulate
potential beneficiaries even though he is constrained to sake credible threats.
A. The_Model
Consider a single testator with N potential beneficiaries, indexed n =1,
...,N.This set of beneficiaries is intended to be exhaustive: it includes
all individuals (spouse, children, other relatives) and institutions (charities,
churches, universities) to which the testator could credibly prorrise asubstan-
tial fraction of his estate. For any particular individual, the size of this
set is an eirpirical question.
Tiire proceeds in discrete periods, labelled t =0.1. 2, ...Thecon-
ditional probability that the testator will die at the end of period t given
that he is alive at the beginning of period t will be denoted w. We assuwe





i.e., the probability that he will survive until t', given thathe is alive in
period t. These survival probabilities are assuired to be publiclyknown.
Although the testator's lifetirre is uncertain, we take potentialbeneficiaries
to be infinitely lived. Relaxing this does not change any substantiveconclu-
sions.
Each period, the testator and potential beneficiaries choose to consuire—T —
awountsC, and {C tn1' respectively. In addition, potential beneficiaries
choose actions at which affect the testator's well—being. For
sinplicity, we assuxre that at is a real nrnrber lying in sou'e interval
0 ( .Weassuwe that the testator's utility is additively separable in
tirre and discounted at the rate .Inparticular, for every period s and for
all strearrs of future consu.irption and actions, his ex ante utility is given by:
T
Z 8 P(s,t) U (c,,, a ts t
We take U to be increasing and strictly concave in each of its arguL"ents.
Siirilarly, for a potential beneficiary n, utility is given by:5
Z ts u (C ,a
t=s n,tn,tn,t
is taken to be increasing and concave in Since we are prirrarily
interested in cases of strategic conflict between testator and beneficiary, we
assuire that a is "bad" froir the beneficiary's point of view (that is, U is
n,t
decreasing and concave in
At tirre t =0,the testator and potential beneficiaries possess initial
wealth W0 and {Wn}ni respectively. Aside froir interest, there are no
infusions of incoire into the systeir after period In each period t, agents
allocate wealth (W, {w}1) between consulrption (ct, {C one period—8—
annuity contracts (Ar. {At}5j) and riskless bonds, the latter yielding a
return in the following period of r.In contrast, for the testator, annuities
yield > r; however, payirent is conditional upon survival. For the case of
fair annuities, 1 + Pt =(1.+ r)/(l —iTt).
Since beneficiaries survive with
probability one, their annuities are equivalent to bonds.
The testator's total wealth evolves according to equation (1).
=
(we,
— — A)(1 + r) + At (1 + (1)
Should he dieatthe end of period t, his total bequest Bt is given by
BtWt_Ct_At
(2)
The evolution of a potential beneficiary's wealth will be governed by an
equation sirrilar to (1):
w =(w —C + b i(t)) (1 + r) (3)
n,t+l n,t n,t n,t
Here, i(t) equals 1 if the testator actually dies in period t, and 0 otherwise;
bn,t is the arrount bequeathedto the nth beneficiary in the event that the
testator dies in period t.
It is convenient at this point to define, for each n and t. the indirect
utility function Vn,t(W) as the solution to the following progratr:
wax E BU (c,o) n n,tn,t
subject to—9—
ZC 1(1+r)T_t n,t
That is, for each potential beneficiary n, tine period t, and wealth levelW,
V(W) indicates the iraxiirus present discounted utility which the potential
beneficiary could obtain if he left the garre (i.e. .set =bt
=0for each
t), and sirrply perforrred life cycle lraxizrization.
Strategic considerations enter through decisions affecting the size and
distribution of bequests. In particular, choices within a period take place in
the following sequence. First, the testator deterirines hisconsurption level,
and divides his reTraining wealth between annuities and bequeathable assets. In
addition, he selects a bequest rule, which specifies criteria for deteririning
the distribution of his bequeathable assets should he die at the end of the
period. Second, potential beneficiaries observe the testator's level of
bequeathable wealth,8 and select current actions and consuirption levels, taking
into account the testator's bequest rule. Nature then deterirines whetheror not
the testator survives; in the case of death, the estate is dividedaccording to
the bequest rule.
Forirally, the bequest rule is a vector of N functions, b (IL. B). whichwap
the history of the gaire up until the testator dies (H) and the level of
bequeathable wealth (B) into a bequest for each beneficiary. In period t, the
testator iraychoosea rule which depends on all behavior that is observable
prior to the soonest possible tin'e of his death (i.e., the end of the j'eriod);
we assuire that the history of beneficiaries' actions is observable, hut that
their current consuTrption cannot be ironitored by testators. We require that the
bequest rule satisfy only one condition for all histories H:—10—
E b (H,B)=B (6)
n1
This restriction reflects two considerations. First, for feasibility, the lc'ft
hand side of (6) cannot exceed the right. Second, since potential beneficiaries
ist receive all bequeathable wealth upon the testator's death, (6) specifies
equality. Since we have defined the set of potential beneficiariesto be
exhaustive, this sirrply follows fron' the fact thatthetestator "can't take it
with hiir." We have assuired that it is possible to identify a set of credible
potential beneficiaries ——atestator will prefer to leave his wealth to sore
subsetof these individuals and institutions even if they all ignore hiswishes9
(as discussed in the introduction, threats to do otherwise are then sirrply not
credible; the perfectness requireirent is irrposed here). Thus, for exairple.
parents iray not be able to successfully issue unreasonable u'Ltirratur'sto their
children, threatening universal disinheritance.
In the next subsection, we show that if there are at least two credible
beneficiaries (N2), then the testator can design a sirrple, intuitively
appealing bequest rule which allows hia' to extract the entire surplusassociated
with testator—beneficiary interaction, even though he is constrained to bequcath
his entire estate to their. The rule establishes a gaire in which potential hne—
ficiaries coirpete for bequests. Thus, "sibling rivalry" errerges as a con-
sequence of parental self—interest. The potential benefitsof such exchiane
induce the testator to hold wealth in bequeathable forirs, even though his cr-
sonal rate of' return falls.—1:1—
B.qilibriuirin a Sile Period
Solvingfor the perfect equilibria of the gare described in thepreceding
section is a soirewhat intricate task. Significant insight into thenature of
this solution can be garnered by first analyzing a single period irodel.This
provides a basis for the recursive solution of the full dynairic rrodelpresented
in the next subsection. Specifically, assuIre that there isa single period, at
the end of which the testator dies with certainty. His utility isa function of
consuirption and beneficiaries' actions, U(C, a); each potential beneficiary's
utility depends on his chosen action and bequest received,
U (an, b).
Decisions are irade in the following order:(1) the testator chooses consuirption
and a bequest rule, (2) beneficiaries choose actions.Subsequently to these
decisions the testator dies, and his estate is dividedaccording to the spe-
cified rule.
We Irotivate the solution to this sirrplegaire as follows. Figure 1
illustrates a particular beneficiary's indifference curves in the(ar. b)
plane. Secall that he thinks ofa as a "bad" ——utilityincreases to the
northwest. Consider the set:
S {(a ,b):U (a ,b)' U(0, 0)} n nn n nn n
S consists of all pairs which the beneficiary weakly prefers to !rinin'urraction
(a 0) and no bequest (see figure 2). Since healways has the option to set
a =0,and since bequests are constrained to be positive,any equilibriwr must
involve beneficiary n consuming an allocation in S.ak
Figure2
Figure 1—13—





s.t.E b +C=W nl n
(a ,b) CSfor each n.
nn n
The solution to this problew, denoted C*, {a*. b}1, would be appropriate if
testators could choose actions for potential beneficiaries subject to the
constraint that each is still willing to participate. Assure there exists a
bequest rule which, along with a consuirption level 0*, induces (a*, b*}N1 as an
equilibriwr. Since this allocation achieves the optiiruw ignoring incentive
constraints, it trust necessarily be the testator's best choice. The perfect
equilibriuir of this sirrplified gatre would then consist of the testator choosing
C* along with this bequest rule, and the beneficiaries playing Nash strategies
in the subgawe defined by the bequest rule.
To characterize the perfect equilibria for this gaire, we need only exhibit
a bequest rule satisfying (6) for which {a*, b*}N1 etrerges as an equilibriurr
in the beneficiaries' subgaxre)-° One such rule operates as follows. We will
refer to {a*, b*}
N
as "benchirark" actions and bequests. Denote the set of nnn=l
beneficiaries who take at least their benchirark actions as K ={n: a >
n n
let K denote the coirpleirent of K. If K is non—en'pty, the testator bequeaths
nothing to ireirbers of K. In contrast, treirbers of K receive their benchrrark
bequests, plus equal shares of the benchirark bequests for rrerrbers of K. If K isempty, then the testator bequeaths the entire estate to sore beneficiary mwhose
action is closest to his benchmark level: a* —aC a —afor all n. Note
m m n n
that total bequests alwvs equal —C,so feasibility and credibility are
satisfied.
This rule defines a simultaneous irove subgare where potential beneficiaries
choose actions an. It is easy to verify that there are N +1Nash equilibria
for this subgaire; one consists of every beneficiary playing his benchmark level.
In the N remaining equilibria, N —1beneficiaries choose their benchmark
levels, while one takes the minimum action. However, for a variety of reasons,
one can safely ignore these less desirableequilibria.11
To summarize: for the simplified game described at the beginning of this
section, the perfect equilibrium consists of the testator choosing consumption
C* along with the bequest rule described in the preceding paragraph, while
potential beneficiaries play Nash strategies in the subgarre defined by the
bequest rule. All other perfect equilibria will yield the same realizationsof
consumption, attention, and bequests along equilibrium' paths. Note that the
testator succeeds in extracting all surplus from his beneficiaries (Un (a, b)
=
Un
(0, a)). The bequest rule exhibited is intuitively appealing: each child
normally receives a positive bequest, but is disinherited if he fails to meet a
standard of "good" behavior. If all children are "bad" the "best" child
receives the entire estate.
Note that the ability of the testator to successfully influence benefi-
ciaries depends critically upon the existence of more than one credible benefi-
ciary. A single credible beneficiary cannot be "played off" against another—15—
agent. Since he is assured of receiving all bequests, no exchange is
possible, and the garre unravels.
C. qilibriur in the Full Model
We are now prepared to characterize the perfect Nash equilibria of the
fully dynawic garre described in the preceding subsection. We use recursion to
show that the above results generalize: as long as N )2,the equilibriur
realizations of all variables directly relevant to the testator (annuities,
bequeathable wealth, testator's consuxrption, beneficiaries' actions, and poten-
tial bequests) are uniquely deteririned, and coincide with the values which the
testator hirrself would select if he rraxiirized his utility subject to the
constraint thatbeneficiaries are willing to participate. Thus, the testator
manages to extract all the surplus associated with testator—beneficiary interac-
tion throughthe use of a sequence of simple, intuitively appealing bequest
rules. This surplus induces the testator to hold wealth in bequeathableforms,
even though his personal return falls.
The solution is determined through backward recursion, beginning with
period T +1.Each beneficiary n starts this period with some (yet to be
determined)wealthlevel, WnT+lSincethe testator has previously died with
certainty, no strategic considerations arise. Optimal individual behavior from
period T ÷1onwards yields utility VnT+l (WnT+l) as previously defined.
Wegenerate complete equilibriumstrategies by induction. That is, assume
we have solved all subgames beginning in period t+1.Assume that the
testator's equilibrium utility for all such subgames (that is, for allperiod
t+1wealthlevels) can be written as V1(W÷1, {Wnt+1}nl)12and that the—6--
0th beneficiary's equilibrium utility is given by V÷1 (w,÷1) whether or
not the testator is alive at the beginning of the period. Decisionsin period t
must be predicated upon subsequent optimization. There aretwo cases to con-
sider. First, the testator may have died prior to period t.In this case,
beneficiaries act non—strategically, and receive indirect utility
Second, the testator nay be alive at the beginning of periodt. The th
beneficiary's expected utility is then given by.
n,t' at) +Bn
{(i ir) L(Wnt —C)
(i + r)]
+ v+1 E(w —
+bnt) (1 + r)1 }
Forany levels of at bat,and let the maximizing value of
be (ant, bt .
and denote corresponding utility by
n,t' bn,t ;









(1 + r) +('- p)
and
= — (ant, bt wfl (1 + r)
We will write this utility more compactly as:
u. (Ct, At, a, bt ,W,ntn1—17—
By reproducing (with minor difications) our analysis of the single period
case, it is possible to show that the testator can design a simple bequest rule
depending only on current actions which supports his constrained optimum
(beneficiaries Imast willingly participate) as an equilibrium.Consequently,
during actual play, the testator necessarily selects such a rule. Formally, we
consider the following program.
C, Axa. bt (Ct, At, a, bt ; w, n,tnl
N
subjectto Eb+C +A W
n=ln,t t t t
(a ,b ) s S for all n
n,tn,t n,t
where
5n,t ={(ant,bn,t)0n,t (ant, bnt ; Wnt) >0n,t o Wnt)}
The solution to this problem offers the testator the maximum utility which he
could obtain if he was unconstrined by incentive problems regarding the choice
of actions in the current period, subject only to a free participation of bene-
ficiaries restriction)-3 we denote this as V (w,{W ). Since the free
t t n,t n=l
participation constraint ordinarily binds at the optimuru,1 we have:
U (a b ; w ) =U (o, 0 ; w ) =v (w ). (8) n,tn,tn,t n,t n,t n,t n,tn,t
Thus, the beneficiary's indirect utility in period t is independent of whether
or not the testator has died; only the testator succeeds in extracting positive
surplus from this exchange of bequests for attention. This completes the induc——iB —
tionstep, allowing us to characterize the unique allocation sustaintd by the
perfectNash equilibria of this model.
II. Econometric Evidence
In this section, we provide empirical support for the hypothesis that
bequests are used, in part, as a means of payment for services rendered by bene—
ficiaires.Specifically, our examination of microeconomic panel data reveals
that contact between parents and children is much higher in families where the
elderly parent has a substantial amount of bequeathable wealth to offer. We show
that this correlation is robust with respect to a variety of specifications and
estimation techniques, which are designed to mie out alternative explanations
based on potentially spurious factors. In addition, we explore some implica-
tions of the particular nodel developed in section I which differentiate it from
closely related alternatives, and use these implications to test the model. The
results are extremely favorable to our formulation of exchange rrotivated
bequests.
Bequests can serve as a means of payment for services only if the presence
of bequeathable wealth can influence the behavior of potential beneficiaries, and
if testators exercise this influence. We adopt a slight abuse of terninolo,
referring to these two distinct aspects of exchange as the "supply" and "demand"
sides.Primarily due to the nature of available data, our basic strat.e if to
estimate the effect of bequeathable wealth on the amount of services which bene-
ficiaries provide to testators ——the"supply" side. Although we do not esti-
mate the "demandt' side explicitly, we provide indirect statistical evidence for—19—
theclainithat testators exploit the relationship between servicesand bequests.
The econometric investigation detailed belowrequires rather specific data
concerning assets and family interactions for a sample ofelderly individuals.
The Longitudinal Retirement History Survey (LRHS), conductedby the Office of
Research and Statistics of the Social SecurityAdministration, collected surpri-
singly extensive information on these characteristics. Data fromthe 1969,
1971, 1973, and 1915 waves of the LRHS were available at the timeof this
writing; unfortunately, insufficient data on assets were collected in1973, so
we were forced to drop this year. Over 11,000 individualsaged 58 to 63 were
included in the first wave. Many of these were lost toattrition, on top of
this, we restricted our sample to married couples who had at leastone child, no
children living at home, and for whom sufficient dataon non—bequeathable assets
were available.15,16 Our final sample consisted of 1,166observations, 855 of
which had two or nre living children, and 311 of which hadonly one living
child.
Measures of attention were constructed as follows. For eachobservation,
the LRHS contains information on total number of children (c.),number of
children who visit or telephone their parentsweekly (vw.), and numberof
children who visit or telephone their parentsmonthly(VM))7 OurI:asureof




V1indicates contact per child, normalized so that maximum contactequals unity.
We have adopted the approximation that children who visitweekly give their—20—
parents four times as imach attention as those who visit monthly. It is
interesting to note in passing that the mean of V. was O.54 in 1969, and rose to
0.63 in 1975 ——evidently,the average level of contact is quite high, and rises
with age.
Other variables were constructed as follows. Bequeathable wealth per child
(b) includes financial wealth (stocks, bonds, mutual funds, bankaccounts,
checking accounts), residential and other property, the face value of life
insurance,'8 privately purchased annuities,19 and debt. Non—bequeathable
annuity wealth per child (a.w) includes Social Security and pension wealth.
These were obtained by converting data on income from those sources to capita-
lized values applying a discount rate of 1.03 and actuarial survival probabili-
ties. Matching administrative records contained data on income earned from 1951
to 1975 in employment covered by Social Security up to the taxable maximum.
This information was extrapolated to yearly earnings using the method described
in Fox (1976). The resulting income stream was then accumulated at a 3% rate of
return to produce a measure of lifetime earnings for both husband and wife.
Other variables used in the following analysis included age of respondent, and
dumn variables indicating whether the respondentts health is better (BH.) or
worse (WH) than that of other members of his cohort, as well as whether the
respondent is retired (RET).
One practical difficulty with these data is that information on the beha-
vior of potential beneficiaries is limited to children. For any given indivi-
dual, the set of credible beneficiaries may or may not be larger. Since our
theory suggest that successful exchange takes place only when this set contains—21—
at least two candidates, we cannot be certain that single child families will
behave in the manner predicted here. Consequently, we initially restrict atten-
tion to families with two or sore children. Analysis and discussion of behavior
in single child families is deferred to the end of this section.
Another general issue which arises with regard to the use of these data
concerns the treatment of separate sample years. Except where noted, results
presented in this paper are based on simple pooling of the samples years ——no
correction is made for potential correlation between distinct observationson
the same household. Such correlation would not, by itself, cause our estimates
to be inconsistent, however, it would imply that standard errors are calculated
incorrectly. In order to determine the probable magnitude of the resulting
error, we reestimated a number of our specifications, employing the appropriate
GLS correction. Although small changes in some point estimates werenoted, no
qualitative conclusions were altered. More importantly, estimated standard
errors on critical coefficients (such as b) differed only slightly from those
obtained with simple pooling.
We begin our analysis by specifying the supply of attention from children
as a function of potential bequest per child:
()
where and b. are defined above, and where c. is a random error term. Within
the context of our theoretical sodel, one can think of equation (9)as a linear
approximation to the implicit function defined by (8), agreated over benef i—
ciaries.—22—
Our first step was to estimate equation (9) using 015.20 Results are pre-
sented as equation 1 in Table 1. While the sign of the coefficient on b. is
consistent with our theory, one cannot reject the hypothesis that bequeathable
wealth holdings have no effect on attention per child.
There are, however, a variety of reasons for believing that 015 estimates
of this relationship may be inconsistent. One reason follows directly from the
structureof our model: explicit consideration of the "demand" side suggests
that bwill be determined endogenously. The parent's optimal choice of
b depends in part upon the preferences of his children,and is an important
component of these preferences. Thus, as long as the parent has more infor-
mation about the preferences of his children than does the econometrician,
and will be correlated. The direction of the resulting bias is, however,
ambiguous.
Correlation between b and is likely to be present for other reasons as
well. Stepping outside the formal
plausible story is that some parent
others do not.21 Those that do may
they like their children, while the
because they like their parents.
Oursolution to this set of problems is to instrument for
(9),usingthe parents' lifetime earnings y.. We justify this
instrument as follows.It is clear that lifetime earnings are
latedwith holdings of bequeathable wealth. We trust establish
tion,this instrument is uncorrelated with ciFor our firststory, y may be
model of the last section, one particularly
s get along well with their children, while
hold more bequeathable wealth simply because






correlated with c. ifparentswork harder when young, so that they have more
wealth with which to influence their children when old. For our secondstory,
this correlation may be non—zero if the elderly parents whose childrenpar-
ticularly like them have been particularly hardworking (or lazy).22 Although one
could, in both cases, plausibly argue that the correlation is non—zero, it is
difficult to believe that it is very large.
2SLS estimates of equation (9)arepresented in column 2ofTable 1.
Notice that the coefficient of b is approximately eight times as largeas the
corresponding OLS estimate, and that the hypothesis of no effect on attention
can be rejected at extremely high levels of confidence. This regression con-
firms our prediction that, in multiple child families, bequeathable wealth will
be strongly correlated with attention.
The apparently striking difference between OLS and 2SLS estimatescan be
tested formally. A Hausman (1978) test reveals that exogeneity of b.can be
rejected at a high level of confidence. This conclusion is consistent with our
model (in which b and a are simultaneously determined), and constitutes
limited evidence in favor of an operative "demand" side. One should, ofcourse,
bear in mind that this rejection of exogeneity is also consistent with other
alternatives. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that the particular alternative
outlined above (correlation between filial and parental altruism) implies that
OLS estimates of the coefficient on b should be biased upwards. Infact, we
observe the opposite.
While our theoretical nedel offers one explanation for the set of results
described above, the observed correlation between attention and bequeathablewealth could also be attributed to a number of spurious factors. We now turn to
the task of ruling out these alternative explanations.
One might object that our basic specification omits a number of important
variables with which both attention and bequeathable wealth are highly corre-
lated. For example, healthy parents may be rmre pleasant to visit (or conver-
sely, less needy of attention), as well as more successfulin the marketplace.
Older parents belong to a poorer cohort, and in general require more care.
Retired parents may have a greater desire for contact with children. We correct





In particular, Z. includes age, health dummies (BE., WH.), and a retirement
dumn (RET1). Results are presented as equation 3in Table 1. The inclusion of
these additional variables appears to have very little impact on either the
magnitude or statistical significance of the coefficient on b..
Another apparently compelling objection is that wealth may al'fect attention
through a variety of spurious channels. For example, parentswith higher wealth
may simply pay for travelling expenses, telephonecalls,and so forth in order to
have re contact with their children. Wealth effects may also be lessdirect.
In particular, there is presumably a positive correlation between the incomesof
parents and their children. A wealthy child may be moredifficult to influence,
or more desirable to visit. Wealthy children may be more capableof defraying
the costs of travel and telephones, buy may also, on average, live fartherfrom—25—
their parents. Thus, the direction of the potential bias is not obvious.
Note, however, that these alternative explanations do not distinguish bet-
ween bequeathable and non—bequeathable (social security and pension annuity)
wealth, as does our theory. A parent's ability to defray the costs of contact
is determined both by his ordinary wealth, and by his claims on annuities.
Similarly, while it is true that the wealth of children is correlated with
parental resources, it is not likely to be highly correlated with the division
of parental resources between bequeathable and non—bequeathable forms. Thus, in
order to determine the magnitude of spurious wealth effects, we add annuity
wealth (awi) to our basic specification:




The effect of holding another dollar of wealth in bequeathable form is then
given by the difference between the coefficients on b and aw. — •23
Estimates of specification (11) are presented as equationin Table 1.
Note that the coefficient of aw (the spurious wealth effect) is negative and
statistically significant, while the coefficient on b. is positive, and highly
significant. The effect of holding wealth in bequeathable rather than
annuitized form, given by the difference between these coefficients, is esti-
mated to be 6.36, with a standard error of 1.89. Thus, correcting for spurious
wealth effects only strengthens our original conclusion.
Another possible solution to the problem of spurious wealth effects is to
restrict attention to a subsample for which these effects are likely to be unim—
portant. If the source of contamination concerns ability to pay, then such—26—
effects may be minimized by considering a subsample for which financ.al costs of
contact are negligible. Presumably, geographic proximity eliminates much of
these costs. Fortunately, the LRILScontainsrelevant information. In Table 2,
we reestimate equation (11) for two subgroups: parents whose children all live
within the same city or neighborhood, and parents whose children all live within
150 miles. The parameter estimates are quite close to those obtained for the
entire sample. In fact, the effect of bequeathable wealth on attention appears
to be largest for parents living in closest proximity to their children.
A related objection concerns the inclusion of housing wealth in our
measure of b1. It has been suggested to us that a positive coefficient on
b1 maysimplyreflect the fact that children prefer to visit parents who live
in nice houses. To accomodate this objection, we reestimated equation (11),












Despitethe fact that most elderly individuals hold a large fraction of their
portfolios in residential housing, these estimates are very close to those pre-
sented in Table 1. On the basis of this evidence, we are inclined to reject
the hypothesis that ourresultsare simply an artifact of sote special feature
of housing wealth.
As a final check on the robustness of our results, we reestimated—27—
equation (n) separately for each of our sample years. Estimates basedon
cross section data from 1969, 1971, and 1975 are presented in Table 3. Note
that the coefficients of interest (those on b. andawi) are extremely stable
over the sample period.
So far, our empirical analysis has been solely concerned withestablishing
a link between attention and bequeathable wealth, and with ruling out alter-
native explanations based on potentially spurious factors. Wenow explore some
other implications of the particular xdel developed in section I whichdif-
ferentiate it from closely related alternatives, and use theseimplications to
test the model.
First,a number of the variables included inshouldaffect the "price"
atwhichattention can be purchased, as well as the absolute amount ofattention
supplied by children. Consider, for example, the variableWH (worse health).
Althoughsick parents mayrecievemoreattention simply due to filial devotion,
ona more cynicalview, illness increases the probability of death, thereby
making a potential bequest of fixed magnitude more valuable to the child, To
differentiate between these effects, we reestimated equation (ii),adding
interactions between b1andWH. BH.andAOE.2b The results presented in Table
are quite striking. Only three coefficients are statistically significant:
those on aw., WH., and WH .b..The coefficient ofawi changes very little
from our original estimate. The coefficient of WI-I. isnegative, indicating
that,aside from exchange motivated concerns, sick parents receive lessatten-
tion. In contrast, the coefficient of •b.is large and positive. This
strongly suggests that, for multiple child families, rich parents who are in—28—
poor health receive much more attention thantheir indigent counterparts. Once
again, the data suggest significant financial rmtivation.
A second strong implication of our particular theory is that exchange
motivated holding of bequeathable wealth can influence the behavior of potential
beneficiaries only if there are at least two credible candidates.
Unfortunately, as mentioned above, there is no way to determine the number of
such candidates for any particular respondent in the LRHS. However, logically
speaking, our theory admits the possibility that children are, in some meaning-
ful sense, the only credible beneficiaries for the bulk of a parent's estate.
This hypothesis can be tested empirically by investigating behavior in single
child families, and comparing them to our multiple child results. We must
emphasiie that this hypothesis is not a consequence of our theory; thus,failure
to differentiate between behavior in single and multiple child families would
not recommend rejection of our theory. However, the absence of a positive
correlation between attention and bequeathable wealth in single child familes
would strongly support our theory, as well as the supplemental hypothesis
that parents cannot credibly threaten to disinherit all of their children.
These considerations motivated us to reestiniate each specification above
using data on single child families. A representative set of resultsis pre-
sented in Table 5. Note that in equations 1 through 14, the pattern of signs on
the coefficients of b and aw1 is precisely the opposite of that obtained for
multiple child families. In addition, the standard errors of coefficients on
key parameters are relatively small. It is worth noting thatthe coefficient of
in these regressions is quite close to the magnitude of the spurious wealth—29—
effect estimated for Imiltiple child families.25 This is what one would expect,
since b. is no longer "contaminated" by an exchange motivated effect. The only
troubling aspect of these estimates is that there appears to be a statistically
significant difference between the coefficients of b1 and awi. presumably,
aw1 should carry only the spurious wealth effect as well. Strictly speaking,
this is inconsistent with our model. Note finally that in equation 5, worse
health continues to have a negative impact on attention (although the magnitude
is not statistically significant); however, there is no evidence that this can
be compensated for by high bequeathable wealth holdings, as in rrultiple child
families. This evidence strongly supports the hypothesis that exchange
motivated bequests take place only in families with at lest two children; thus,
children are usually the only credible beneficiaries. It is difficult to recon-
cile this conclusion with any known model of bequests other than that presented
in section I.
One possible alternative explanation of the differing results for single
child famiiles runs as follows. Suppose children are altruists, but they are
primarily concerned with making certain that their parents receive a particular
amount of total care and attention from all children. Then within any sample of
families with the same number of children (such as single child families), there
will be no observed relationship between attention and bequeathable wealth.
However, comparing families with different number of children but the same total
level of bequeathable wealth, one would find a correlation between attention per
child and bequeathable wealth per child ——children"shirk" in larger families.
Aslong as total wealth is not too highly positively correlated with the number—30—
of children (which seems plausible), one would observe a positive correlation
between wealth per child and attention per child in the "severalchildren" sub-
sample, but no such correlation anon6 single child famIlies.
Note that this argument does not entirely succeed in explaining the results
of this section, since it applies equally well to both bequeathable and annuity
wealth. Our case is predicated upon the difference between these coefficients.
Nevertheless, as a further check of robustness, we reestiniated equation(11)
separately for two and three child families. Results are presented inTable 6.
Forboth groups, key parameter estimates are very close to those obtained for
the original sample. We must qualify this conclusion only by noting that the
standard error for the coefficient of b in three child families is substan-
tially larger than either that obtained for two child families, or for the
pooled sample. We interpret these results as additional strong supportfor the
exchange nxtivated bequest hypothesis.
A further remark on the difference between single and multiple child fami-
lies is in order. Just as it is difficult to see how this difference could be
reconciled with any other known theory of bequests, it is also difficult to see
why any explanationof our multiple—child results based on potentially ptxrious
factorswouldnot apply equally well to single child families. Thus, our
resultsrefute any alternative explanation which fails to account for the
single/multiple child distinction. We believe that this makes the empirical
case for our theory compelling.
Taken as a whole, the preceding estimates are extremely favorable to our
model. It is therefore important to emphasize that our results were extremely—31—
robust, and that these estimates are representative of other regressions which
we ran, but did not include in this paper. Aside from some problems with
selecting a proper subsample (for example, one preliminary sample inadvertently
included observations of which children lived at home, making interpretation of
visits and telephone calls difficult), our procedures produced favorable results
on the first try, and subsequent modifications altered no substantive conclu-
sions. Full disclosure requires that we report three apparent "failures.'t
First, OtIS estimates of all but the simplest specification (equation 1, Table 1)
yielded negative coefficients on b.. This is not surprising in light of our
arguments concerning the endogeneity of b. in fact, we submit that the discre-
pancy between OtIS and 2SLS estimates strengthens the case for an operative
"demand" side. Second, attempts to estimate a fixed effects version of themodel
produced nonsensical coefficients with large standard errors. However, since no
sensible instrument is available for fixed effects estimation (there isonly one
observation on lifetime earnings for each respondent), we were not troubledby
this finding. Finally, estimates based on an alternative measure of attention
(letters received from children) were much less striking.Although the pattern
of coefficients was consistent with our theory (the coefficient of b.was
greater than the coefficient for aw for multiple child families, and visa versa
for single child families), alternative hypotheses could not be rejected with
any reasonable level of confidence. Upon reflection we decided that the letters
variable was not a very satisfactory proxy for attention since parents whowere
frequently visited persunably received few letters.
Estimates of —
82have a very tangible interpretation: since holding an—32—
additional dollar of wealth in bequeathable forms elicits —
B2units of
attention, one can infer from these coefficients a "price" ofattention. e
undertake the following rough calculations to et some feel for magnitudes.




increasing bequeathable wealth per child by roughly i6OODD will raise from
0 (no attention) to 1 (maximum attention). If we interpretmaximum attention as
52 contacts per child per year (each child visiting or calling once perweek is
consistent with V1 =i),then holding bequeathable wealth of approximately
$3,000 results in an additional visit per year, on average. The costof holding
wealth in this form is the incremental return which the parentwould have
received had he invested this money in annuities. If. for example, the return
sacrificed is 2 percent, then our estimates imply that an additional visit or
call costs the parent $60 on themargin.26 This figure is, of course, very
imprecise, but not implausible.
III. Other Evidence
The preceding econometric analysis of the LRHS data favors theview that
exchange plays an important role in bequest behavior. Byand large the rcdic—
tions of our model are confirmed. At least some of these predictions arenot
implications of alternative models of bequest behavior. Beyondthis evidence,
there are a number of other aspects of individual behaviorwhich are more easily
reconciled our model of exchange motivated bequests than with alternativefor—
mulat ions.
There are at least three alternative formulations to the presentmodel of—33—
bequestbehavior which have been widely studied. These are the "accidental
bequests," "bequests for their own sake" and "altruistic bequests" models. The
first, recently urged by Davies (1981), suggests that consumers do not have
bequest motives, and that bequests arise only as a consequence of uncertainty
about the date of death in conjunction with annuity market imperfections. A
second model, used by Blinder (19Th) and many others, assumes that consumers'
lifetime utility depends in part on the size of their bequest. On this view
bequests are a form of terminal consumption. A final possibility is the
"altruistic" view of bequests put forth by Barro (1974) and Becker (1974, 1981).
On this view parents maximize a utility function in which the utility of their
children also enters.
Each of these formulations is inconsistent with the empirical observation
that consumers are reluctant to participate in annuity type arrangements even on
quite favorable terms. Moreover, the second and third formulations cannot
account for the apparent insignificance of gifts. We first review the available
evidence, then indicate why it contradicts the three standard models of bequest
behavior, and finally describe why such behavior is consistent with our model.
Privately purchased annuities are a rarity in the American Economy. The
Retirement History Survey revealed that such annuities rarely represented more
than a very small fraction of wealth, and in most cases were not purchased at
all. Of course, this may well be due to the fact that adverse selection compli-
cates the working of this market.27 Perhaps more persuasive evidence comes from
the lack of market response to "reverse annuity mortgages." These instruments
allow individuals to annuitize their home equity. Even where they are offered314
on relatively favorable terms, they do not appear to be well received.28A simi-
lar conclusion is suggested by the lack of aresponse to a California state
program which allowed property owners to defer property taxes until after their
death, on a subsidized basis.29
Perhaps the strongest evidence of consumer resistance to annuitiescomes
from an examination of the choices made by retirees under theTIAA—CREF program.
This group is mainly comprised of educators whoare presumably better informed
than most pension recipients. Retirees are offered severaloptions, including
full annuities and"n year certain" plans.3° A 10year certain plan, for
example, guaranteesthat a retiree and his heirs will receive at least 10years
worth of benefits,even if the retiree dies sooner.3' A 1913 studyreported that
over 70 percent ofbeneficiaries chose plans other than those providing full
annuity protection.This suggests a desire to make allowances forbequests.
This evidencesuggests that there is no strong latent demand on thepart of
aged Americans forannuity protection, and is
"accidental bequestt' model. On this view individualsshould purchase annuity
protection even if it is very unfair actuarily, since bequestsare not value..1 at
all. In particular, the choice of "years certain'tannuity protection directly
contradicts the "accidental bequests" model.
Less obviously, the reluctance of consumers to t&keadvantage of actuarially
fair or subsidized annuities is inconsistent with the"bequests for their own
sake" and "altruistic" models of bequests. It is wellknown (see, for example,
Sheshinski and Weiss (1981) or Bernheim (l98lb)) that undersuch for.xlations,
consumers who have access to actuarially fair annuity markets willperfectly—35—
insure,financing consumption entirely out of annuity income. An underan—
nuitized individual will finance consumption partly out of bequeathable wealth,
while an overannujtjzed individual will save some fraction of his annuity
income, thereby building an estate. Thus, if an individual consumes some por-
tion of either the principal or income from his bequeathable wealth, we infer
that he is underannuitized, and should take advantage of actuarially fair oppor-
tunities to purchase annuities.
There are two reasons to believe that individuals hold bequeathable wealth,
in part to finance their own personal consumption. First, despite the earlier
findings of Brittain (1978) and Mirer (1979), more recent studies by King arid
Dicks—Mireaux (1983), Diamond and Hausman (1983), and Berriheim (l98Ia) suggest
that retirees do dissave from bequeathable wealth. Second, if bequeathable
wealth is held only for the purpose of making intergenerational transfers, then
these transfers would be made as gifts, rather than as bequests at death. Early
transfer confers two advantages: it allows beneficiaries to annuitize the opti—
inal fraction of transferred resources immediately; and it may ease liquidity
constraints encountered by beneficiaries early in the life cycle.32
To summarize: behavioral evidence suggests that individuals hold
bequeathable wealth in part to finance personal consumption. Under either the
"bequestsfor their own sake" or "altruistic" models, this implies thatsuch
individuals areunderanriuitized, and should take advantage of actuarially fair
opportunities to insure. Yet this prediction is counterfactual.
The reluctance of very wealthy individuals to convert bequests into intra
vivos gifts poses a further puzzle for these alternative theories. Despite the—36—
existenceof significant tax advantages to transferring resources during lifeti-
mes, many wealthy individuals who can anticipate leaving large bequestswith
virtual certainty, do not make significant intra vivos gifts. This observation
has disturbed some proponents of dynastic altruism, who recognize that an impor-
tant implication of this model is that families will con.jure their affaris to
minimize total tax liability. While some (notably Adams (1978)) have defended
dynastic altruism by arguing that, contrary to Shoup (1966),Cooper (1979),and
Menchik (1980), tax minimizing transfers are in fact observed, we find this
claim implausible.33
The exchange motivated bequest model described in Section
these counterfactual implications concerning the acceptance of
claim on a known estate, and vague promises of contemporaneous rewards are sub-
ject to equivocation by parents who would prefer to retain resources, ex post.
A common finding in empirical analyses of bequests (Sussman et.al. (1970),
Brittain (1978), Menchik (1980fl1 is that, in most cases, parents give equal
amounts to each of their offspring. In part, this conclusion may arise from
focusingprimarily on cashratherthan the more difficult to value tangible
I does not share
annuities and the
use of gifts. Since parents do not care about their
directly, there is no reason to smooth out transfers
Furthermore, by making all intentional transfers at
his ability to influence his children in subsequent
quite likely that it is easier to influence children
opposed to gifts. Few families are so mercenary as
o 2.contracts;thus, the lure of gifts tends to
children's consumption
over states of nature.
once, the parent attenuates
periods. Finally, it is
by promising bequests, as
to countenance explicit quid
bemore speculative than a—37—
bequests.The model here nakes no prediction that bequests should be equal
across children, except by coincidence or if beneficiaries are identical. Equal
bequests pose an equal or greater problem for the altruistic model, which issues
the clear prediction that bequests should be used to equate as closely as
possible the utilities of various offspring.35 The implication that, in effect,
parents impose 100 percent tax rates on their children's other income is clearly
counterfactual. The other two models of bequests do not haveany clear itnplica-
tions for this issue.
So far we have been content to infer motives indirectly from behavioral
observations. Studies by Sussrnan et.al.(1970)and Horioka (1983) offer much
moredirect evidence on the nature of bequest motives. Both studies confirm the
significance of exchange motivated bequests.
Sussman et.al. conducted a painstaking studyofclose to 1,000 estates
selected from Cleveland probate court. They document the use of bequests as a
means of payment by finding a significant effect of intrafamily exchange on
deviations from equal division of bequests. In case after case, "reciprocity
was expressed through the distribution to particular children for services ren-
dered to parents," so that "children who took care of their elders...received
the largest share of the parentts property or the only share if the estatewas
verysmall" (p.290). Disinheritance was usually a side effect of' rewarding a
specific child for care given in old age (p. 103), although some parents speci-
fically disinherited children who ignored them.
It is important to emphasize that both testators and beneficiaries clearly
perceived and consciously exploited opportunities for exchange involving—38—
bequests. Testators frequently left most of their estates to spouses in jart so
that the spouses would "have a legacy to use in bargaining for services from
children and others later on" (p. 290). Likewise, "children feel that they
should maintain intimate contract with a6ed parents in order to provide them
with emotional support and social and recreational opportunities, and that such
contact maintenance is requisite for obtaining a share of the inheritance" (p.
119). When interviewed, children "generally accept the notion that the sibling
as
a lower bound on the significance of exchange motivated bequests. Thetradi-
tional pattern in Japanese families is for the eldest son to move in with and
care for his elderly parents until their deaths, at which time he receivesthe
entire estate. Thus, the 43.2 percent of respondents who indicated that they
would "give all to the eldest son" may have simply announced their equilibrium
choices, having already received cooperation from that child. It is worth
noting that only 12.1 percent said that they would "divide equally betweenone's
children," while only 4.3 percent were inclined to 'give to the child who is ill
or physically weak or who has no income—earning power." Thus, neither
utilitariannor altruistic motives appear to be particularly prevalent.
who has rendered the greatest amount of service
receive a major portion of the inheritance" (p.
bequests be divided according to the principle
Rorioka (1983) reproduces the results of a
elderly in Japan toward the distribution of the
35.1 percent of the respondents indicated that
child or children who did more for me." This,
to the aged parent should
118), and usually prefer that
of reciprocity (p. 1b8).
surveyof attitudes of the
irassets among their children,
they would "give more to the
however,should be thought of—39—
IV. Mac roeconomic iplicatio
In the preceding section, we developed the implications of our mud1 for
several aspects of individual behavior, and contrasted these with predictions
based on alternative xjdels. This section focuses on the macroeconomic implica-
tions of exchange ntivated bequests.
Our paper provides an example of an environment in which parents and
children are linked by voluntary utility maximizing intergenerational trinsfers,
but for which the "Ricardian equivalence theorem" and related propositions are
nevert1ieless false. The implications of our formulation for issues such as the
effects of Social Security and government indebtedness on capital formation
correspond very closely to the implications of standard life—cycle model.3b To
see this, observe that the bequests made parents are independent of the eco—
nomic welfare of their children, except to the extent that changes in their eco-
nomic welfare affect their supply curve of attention. Note that the sin of the
effect of an increase in children's economic welfare on bequests (parental
"expenditures"onattention) will depend on whether the elasticity of dcmtnd for
attentionisgreater or less than unity.
Several reasons for preferring the current model to the "dynastic a t 'uism"
formulation of Barro were discussed in the preceding sections. We are wuware
of any direct microeconomic evidence favoring the notion of altruistic h1ucts.
Until such evidence is provided, economists should be cautious about jutifying
the analytical use of infinite lived consumers by appealing to dynastic
altruism.
The ndel developed here suggests a number of potentially importantrising life expectancies, longer retirement periods, and increasing geographic
mobility mayallaffect the national savings rate. These and related issues are
discussed in Bernheim (l98c).
The model also suggests that international variations in savings rates may
be related to differences in family structure, as well as to legal institutions
governing the distribution of estates. For example, Horioka's evidence indica-
tes that exchange motivates the division of bequests in many Japanese house-
holds. In addition to the survey of attitudes discussed in section III, he
documents that over 80 percent of elderly Japanese live with their children,
compared to approximately 10 percent for the U.S. This may help to account for
Japan's high rate of saving. In contrast, certain European countries such as
Sweden (see Blornquist (1919)) require testators to divide the bulk of their
estates evenly between their children. This restriction neutralizes the ruecha—
interactions between demographic and economic phenomena.
bequests on behavior, parents may successfully influence
children concerning education, migration, and marriage.
services from children, coupled with the need to have at
beneficiaries, may also affect fertility. This could, f
Park's (1983) observation that Korean households have a
two male children, and could strengthen theories of the
transition" based on parental desire for care during old
suggests that various exogenous demographic trends will
effects. Declining population growth means more single
therefore less incentive to save to purchase attention.
By condftioning
decisions by their
The desire to purchase
leasttwo credible
or example, account for
strongpreference for
so—called "demoraphic
age. The model also
have specific economic
child families, and
For similar reasons,nism outlined in Section I, and removes a strong incentive for accumulating
bequeathable wealth.
Our analysis also suggests a subtle but possibly important side effect of
the growth of Social Security and the spread of annuitized private pensions.
The model here provides a partial explanation for consumers' reluctance to
purchase annuities at even relatively attractive rates: annuities deny con—
sumers the opportunity to purchase care and attention from their children
(although much of the actual aversion to annuities is undoubtably based on
ignorance and confusion). If Social Security or pensions foist more annuity
protectionon consumers than they wish, a collateral consequence will be that
consumers are able to purchase less attention than they would prefer. A general
decline in attentiveness of children to parents is widely alleged to have taken
place since the introduction of Social Security (see for example Friedman
(1980)). The significance of the effect stressed here is of course difficult to
gauge.37
This research could usefully be ectended in a number of directions. The
theoretical model could be elaborated to allow more fully for the element of
"caring" which explains whyparentscrave attention from their ownchildren. It
would also be valuable to explore models in which more elaborate interactions
between children were possible. Empirically, the insights siiested bythis
modelcould be used to inform econometric analyses of the consumption and port-
folio choices of the aged. In addition, it might be useful to use simulation
techniques to examine the relation between bequests of the type modelled here
and the level or capital formation. It is unlikely that anyofthese extensions— 2—
would cast doubt on ir conclusion that the exchange imtive is centr-i.1 to
the economic analysis of bequests.143.
Footnotes
1. The significance of intergenerational transfers is still the subject of
much debate. Tobin (1961) and Davies (1981) present simuiLation results
which indicate that pure Life Cycle motives are sufficient to account for
the bulk of U.S. capital.
2. Brittain (1978) and Mirer (1979) document continued accumulation of wealth
after retirement. Shorrocks (1975), King and Dicks—rireaux (1981), and
Diamond and Hausman (1983) find limitedevidenceto dispute this claim.
Bernheini (1984a) confirms this finding, but demonstrates that behavioral
responses of rates of decumulation to non—discretionary annuities are
inconsistent with the predictions of simple life cycle models.
3. As long as it is impossible for a potential beneficiary to predecease the
testator, relaxing this restriction simply involves adjusting the discount
factors of children to account for survival probabilities after period T.
Althugh the analysis becomes more complex when it is possible for children
to die first (we must worry about what happens for all possible patterns of
deaths), it is possible to show that, even in this case, our basic conclu-
sions are unchanged.
4. In the case of parents andchildren,such actions might include attention,
care, or choice of the "right" spouse. For institutional beneficiaries,
a t might for example represent naming a building after a potential testa—
to.
5. Notice that in the current formulation single period utility does not
depend directly upon whether the testator is alive (the dependence is
indirect, since we will never observe a >0once the testator has
died). This restriction is convenient, lut inessential.
6. Time separability of utilities simplifies the method of solution. We doubt
that our basic insights would be changed in a more general model.
7. Allowing exogenous future income for potential beneficiaries would not
alter the analysis at all. Allowing testators to receive some exogcnous
income would not affect the qualitative conclusions as long as desired
wealth held by the testator is always strictly positive.
8. It is in the testators's interest to hold his wealth in easily observed
forms. This mayprovidea partial explanation of the notorious reluctance
of the elderly to sell their houses (although there are certainly other
factors involved).
9. Limiting the set of potential beneficiaries does involve some notion of
altruism which extends only to a certain class of individuals or intitu—
tions. In this very limited sense the bequests considered here are
altruistic._1414_
10. There may be many bequest rules which sustain {a, b}1 as an equilibrium
in the appropriate subgame. However, the perfect equilibrium will be uni-
que in the sense that any such equilibrium must yield C,{a, b}1 on
the equilibrium path.
11. We suggest two reasons:(i) for all e >0if the testator sets benchmark
levels at a —crather than a and otherwise employs the same rule, there
is a unique Nash equilibrium consisting of all agents meeting their bench-
marks. In other words, the testator can get arbitrarily close to his opti-
mum without running into the problem of multiplicity, (2) the N undesirable
equilibria are not trembling hand perfect (see Selten (1975)). Consider
the potential beneficiary who sets a =0,while expecting his competitors
to offer their benchmark levels. He cannot be worse off by playing a =
an*.In addition, if he thinks there is any chance, however small,that
another beneficiary will make a mistake ("tremble"), thereby missing his
benchmark level, a* will in that event yield strictly higher utility than
a =0.
12. For t =Twe adopt the convention that VT÷l (WT+1, {w T+1n=1 =0
since the testator is no longer living.
13. Note that in this problem, we do not allow the testator to choose consump-
tion levels for the beneficiaries. This is so because we have restricted
bequest rules to depend on actions only. It might be possible for the
parent to condition bequests on the beneficiary's consumption as well.
Although in our model this makes no difference, in another specification it
may be in parent's interest to do this. It is straightforward to modify
the model so that such strategies are permissible.
1. Assume it does not bind. Then the testator can successfully deaind more
attention from each beneficiary without holding more bequeathable wealth.
This directly increases utility. However, there is also an indirect
effect. Changing ak will alter the beneficiary's optimal level of Cn t
thus changing W t+) This has an ambiguous effect on It seems
quite unlikely tftat such secondary effects would dominate.
15. Specifically, we include those who began to receive pensions and Social
Security at some point during the sample.
16. Note that our theory predicts that use of bequests to obtain attention
should be more effective when there is only one parent. By considering
couples, we presumably stack the odds against finding evidence of
exchange.
17. For some years,the survey also asked for the number of children who visit
or telephone daily; in other years, this was simply incorporated into the
"at least weekly" category. To be consistent over years, we added daily
contact to weekly contact in years for which the former was available._14 5....
18. It is appropriate to include the face value of life insurance, since
children wish to be named as beneficiaries. Unfortunately, data on life
insurance are quite poor; in particular, it is impossible to determine how
much individuals have borrowed against their policies. Omitting insurance
from our definition of bequeathable wealth has an insignificant impact on
the estimates presented in this section.
19. Most privately purchased "annuitiest' fail to match the economic definition,
since they have bequeathable components.
20. Throughout, we have ignored potential problems arising from truncation of
our dependent variable. There is little reason to believe that this biases
our results in any particular direction.
21. Our goal here is only to suggest a significant exchange not ivated element
in bequest behavior, not to deny that altruistic aspects are also present.
22. The direction of this correlation is not clear. If a parent likes his
child, he may work harder to provide sore physical goods, or work less to
spend more time with the child.









.th. W. is the total wealth of the iindividual.82 captures spurious wealth
e'fects, and81 —82is the independent effect o? holding wealth in a
bequeathable form.
2.&. For the 2SLS regressions, we included interactions between lifetime income
and WH, BH, and AGES in the instrument list.
25. That is, it equals the coefficient on annuity wealth in the equations pre-
sented in Table 1.
26. The one year probability of dying is 2.9 percent for 65yearold males and
1.5 percent for 65 year old females. The 2 percent figure assumes approxi-
mate fairness of available annuities.
27. Though one would expect the adverse selection to be much more serious in
the relatively well functioning market for life insurance. Warshawsky
(1983) presents evidence that loads on annuities are comparable to loads on
life insurance.
28. For a survey of the evidence on this topic see A Summary of Recent Research
on Inflation and the Elderly, by Urban Systems Research and Engineering,
1983.
29. See URSE (1983).
30. Annuity amounts are set so that the plans are, in principle, equivalent on
an actuarial basis, see TIAA—CREF (1973).—4 6—
31. In each case, provision is rde for surviving spouses.
32. Note also that the failure of parents to transfer their homes to their
children is inconsistent with the Kotlikoff—Spivak view that families serve
to provide private annuity insurance.
33. Adams overstates the burden of the capital gains tax hy neglecting the fact
that the beneficiary can defer realizing any assets with capital gains, and
can use a variety of other devices to shelter them. Nor does his analysis
explain the failure of most families to set up non—reverting trusts which
allow assets, and in some cases capital income as well to escape tax almost
entirely. Lastly, Adams' analysis cannot explain whyassetswithout capi-
tal gains, or even with capital losses, also appear to be transferred as
gifts only infrequently.
34. Disputed, however, by Tomes (1981).
35. Assuming they enter symmetrically the parent's utility function.
36. Barro (1974, footnote 14) himself notes that the Ricardian equivalence
theorem would not hold if exchange played a large role in motivating
bequests.
37. The model also implies that Social Security offsets private savings by less
than one for one.—4T—
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Dependent Variable: V
SairpleMultiple Child Falies —PooledPanel
Equation 1 2 3
Procedure OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS______
Constant .560 .531 .088 .225
(.008) (.013) (.201) (.215)
b/b6 .333 2.30 2.57 .58











Degrees of 2563 2563 2559 2558
Freedow
Standard Error .357 .360 .360 .369
of RegressionTable 2
Dependent Variable: V
Sarple: Multiple Child Families —PooledPaneL
Procedure: 2SLS
Equation 1 2
Subsawple Allchildrenwithin All children within















Degrees of 365 1001
Freedoir
Standard Error .309 .331
of RegressionTable 3
Dependent Variable: V
Sarple: Multiple Child Fairilies —SeparateYears
Procedure: 2SLS
Sairp Year 1969 1971 1975




av/106 —1.59 —1.80 —i.8i
(i.i14) (i.14i) (2.19)
age/100 .070 .610 —.993
(.811) (.88i) (.737)
bh/100 7.31 —4.o —5.141
(6.02) (3.28) (2.61)
vh/100 —10.2 —2.10 —.091
(ii.i) (14.00) (3.147)
ret/100 —.238 —763 —10.0
(14.26) (2.99) (8.09)
Degrees of 8148 8148 8148
Freedor
StandardError .3714 .388 .31414
of RegressionTable 4
DependentVariable: V

































.1451 .1451 .14146 .1452 .1453
Equation I
Procedure OLS





















































931 931 927 926 923Table 6
Dependent Variable: V
Sa.rrple: Multiple Child Farilies —PooledPanel
Procedure; 2SLS
Equation 1















Degrees of 11214 710
Freedoir
Standard Error .383 .3145
of Regression